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Abstract: Searchable encryption schemes allow users to perform keyword based
searches on an encrypted database. Almost all existing such schemes only consider
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write operations by multiple users. In this paper, we systematically study searchable
encryption in a practical multi-user setting. Our results include a set of security no-
tions for multi-user searchable encryption as well as a construction which is provably
secure under the newly introduced security notions. We also discuss to improve query
efficiency.
Keywords: searchable encryption; database security; multi-user setting; privacy;
prototype.
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Yang, Y.J., Ding X.H, Deng,
R.H. and Bao, F. (2008) ‘Multi-User Private Queries over Encrypted Databases’, Int.
J. High Performance Computing and Networking, Vol. 1, Nos. 1/2/3, pp.64–74.
Biographical notes: Yanjiang Yang is a Research Fellow at Institute for Infocomm
Research, Singapore. He completed his PhD degree from National University of Sin-
gapore in 2005. His research interests include information security and applied cryp-
tography.
Xuhua Ding is an assistant professor at School of Information Systems, Singapore Man-
agement University. He received his PhD in Computer Science from the University of
Southern California, USA, in 2003. His research focuses on information security, ap-
plied cryptography.
Robert H. Deng is a professor, Associate Dean for Faculty & Research, and Director of
SIS Research Center, School of Information Systems, Singapore Management Univer-
sity. He received his PhD from Illinois Institute of Technology, USA. He has 26 patents
and more than 200 technical publications in international conferences and journals in
the areas of computer networks, network security and information security.
Feng Bao is the principal scientist and the department head of the Cryptography &
Security Department at Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore. He received his
PhD in computer sciences from Gunma University, Japan, in 1996. He has published
more than 180 international journal/conference papers and owned 16 patens.
1 INTRODUCTION
With the prevalence of network connectivity, a typical
paradigm of many enterprise database applications is for
multiple users to access a shared database via a local area
network or the Internet. Moreover, recent years have seen
the surge of database outsourcing, where databases are
hosted and managed by a third party which offers database
services to users. For business-critical or security-sensitive
data, encryption is often used as the last line of defense to
combat unsolicited data accesses. Consider the following
application example. A federation of healthcare institutes
plans to establish a medical database so that their medical
practitioners and researchers can share clinic records and
research results. To reduce the operational cost, manage-
ment of the database is outsourced to a database service
provider. The database is encrypted in order to comply
with patient privacy related laws, such as HIPPA in the
United States, and yet the encrypted database must be
searchable by authorized users.
Searchable encryption is a cryptographic primitive that
enables users to perform keyword-based searches on an en-
crypted database just as in normal database transactions
(Curtmola et al., 2006; Chang and Mitzenmacher, 2005;
Goh, 2003; Song et al., 2000). However, all the existing
schemes are limited to the single-user setting where the
database owner who generates the database is also the
single user to perform searches on it. To support multi-
user searches, Curtmola et al. (2006), by directly extend-
ing their single-user schemes, suggest to share the secret
key for database searching among all users. Their scheme
allows only one user to write to the database, though mul-
tiple users are able to search. Unfortunately, many prac-
tical applications (e.g., the aforementioned healthcare fed-
eration example) require a database to support both write
and search operations by multiple users. Moreover, user
revocation in their scheme is based on broadcast encryp-
tion, where a revocation affects all non-revoked users.
A na¨ıve approach of extending a single-user scheme to a
full-fledged multi-user scheme is to share secret keys (or the
private keys of public key based systems (see Section 2))
among all users. However, it suffers from several serious
shortcomings. First, there is no feasible means to deter-
mine the originator of a query in a provable manner, since
all queries are generated from the same key. This becomes
unacceptable when accountability of queries is desired by
the database application. Secondly, user revocation can be
prohibitively expensive. In a multi-user application, user
revocation is a routine procedure. For a key-sharing based
scheme, revocation often implies a new round of key dis-
tribution involving all non-revoked users. Obviously, this
is not scalable for large and dynamic systems where user
revocation may occur frequently. One may suggest us-
ing access control to complement key sharing in order to
address the problem of user revocation (i.e., user revoca-
tion does not entail key renewal). However, deployment
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of access control in practice is prohibitively expensive as
pointed out in Curtmola et al. (2006), and worse yet, users
have to maintain an additional set of secrets. Thirdly,
many searchable encryption schemes follow the symmetric
access paradigm, i.e., the same key is used for index gen-
eration and search. Therefore, once a revoked user breaks
the security perimeter of a database system and gains il-
legal access to the encrypted database, she is still able to
search it at her will. One remedy could be to update the in-
dexes after every user revocation. However, it is obviously
infeasible for large databases due to the immense cost it
entails.
In this paper, we systematically study searchable en-
cryption in the multi-user setting. We formulate a system
model and define its security requirements. We also pro-
pose an efficient construction, which offers not only the
conventional query privacy, but also the following new fea-
tures.
• Our system allows a group of users, each possess-
ing a distinct secret key, to insert their encrypted
data records to the database while every user in the
group is able to search all the records using her cho-
sen keywords with the assistance from a semi-trusted
database server.
• Our system allows the user management of the
database owner organization to dynamically and ef-
ficiently revoke users. Our revocation does not re-
quire distribution of new keys, nor needs to update
the encrypted database including the indexes. After
a revocation, the revoked users are no longer able to
search the database, while the revocation process is
transparent to those non-revoked users. Our system
also allows for dynamic user enrollment, since a user
joining does not affect other user’s settings.
• Our system offers query unforgeability in the sense
that neither a dishonest user nor the database server
is able to generate valid queries on behalf of another
user unless her secret key is compromised.
We use bilinear maps so that users using different query
keys still generate the same index for a keyword. However,
the performance of our construction does not deteriorate
due to the use of bilinear maps, as the database server only
needs to perform a pairing operation for a query.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, we show the related work and highlight the differ-
ence between our work and other searchable encryption
schemes. Then, we define the system and formulate secu-
rity requirements in Section 3. Our proposed construction,
together with a rigorous security analysis and a perfor-
mance evaluation, are presented in Section 4. A technique
to speedup query efficiency is also discussed in Section 4.
Concluding remarks are in Section 5.
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2 RELATED WORK
Our work is under the umbrella of searchable encryption,
which in general allows a user to search among encrypted
data and find the data containing a chosen keyword. The
first practical scheme of this kind is due to Song et al.
(2000), who consider searches across encrypted keywords
within a file with an overhead linear to the file size. Goh
(2003) and Chang and Mitzenmacher (2005) propose to
search encrypted indexes of a set of documents. Their ap-
proaches improve the search efficiency at the cost of a large
storage for the constructed indexes (the bit-length of the
index for each document is proportional to the total num-
ber of keywords). A formal security notion of searchable
encryption is defined in Curtmola et al. (2006) which also
constructs schemes provably secure against non-adaptive
and adaptive adversaries. Yang et al. (2006) apply the con-
cept of searchable encryption to dynamic databases. The
works of Ballard et al., 2005; Golle et al., 2004 consider the
variation of simultaneous search of conjunctive keywords.
All of the schemes above make use of symmetric key
primitives. The first public-key based searchable encryp-
tion scheme is due to Boneh et al. (2004), where the pri-
vate key holder can perform a search among messages en-
crypted under the corresponding public key. Park et al.,
2004; HWang and Lee, 2007 propose variations of con-
junctive keywords search in the public key setting. Ab-
dalla et al. (2005) further analyze the consistency property
of public key based searchable encryption, and demon-
strate a generic construction by transforming an anony-
mous identity-based encryption scheme. Latest results and
variations on public-key based search encryption include
(Boneh and Waters, 2007; Shi and Waters, 2008; Katz
et al., 2008)
However, none of the above schemes fully consider the
multi-user setting. All the searches are performed under a
single key. Note that while public key based schemes al-
low for multi-user writing, only the key holder who knows
the private key can perform searches. As a result, apply-
ing public key based searchable encryption schemes to the
multi-user setting would face the same problem as that
of symmetric key based ones. Although Curtmola et al.
(2006) suggested to employ broadcast encryption to allow
multiple user search, it only allows a single user to write to
the database. Moreover, their scheme is more suitable for
a static collection of documents than a dynamic database.
By contrast, our work in this paper studies searchable en-
cryption in database applications where a group of users
share data in a way that all users are able to write to and
search an encrypted database without sharing their secrets.
3 MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
3.1 System Model
We consider a database system {D, UM, Serv, U}, where
D is a database; UM is the user manager of the data
owner organization that is responsible for the management
of users, e.g., user enrolment and user revocation; Serv is
the database server providing the search service; U is a
group of users.
The database D consists of m records {d1, · · · , dm} of
multiple attributes. One of the attributes is the keyword
used for search (note that it is straightforward to consider
multiple keyword attributes). The domain of the keyword
attribute is denoted by W. The keyword of di is denoted
by di.w. Serv does not host the database D directly;
instead, it hosts an encrypted version of D, denoted by
D′ = {d′1, · · · , d′m}, where d′i = 〈E(di), I(di.w)〉: the first
component is an encryption of di and the second is the out-
put of an index generation function I(·) on di.w. Let ED =
{E(d1), · · · , E(dm)} and ID = {I(d1.w), · · · , I(dm.w)}.
With the assistance of Serv, an authorized user u ∈
U , is allowed to insert data records to D′ and to search
data records including those inserted by others based on
her chosen keywords. We use qu(w) to denote a query
from user u on keyword w ∈ W. On receiving query q =
qu(w), Serv is expected to return aq = {E(di) | di ∈
D, di.w = w}. Whenever necessary, UM may revoke a
user’s privilege of searching the database. Therefore, the
user set U is divided into an authorized user set UA and
a revoked user set UR. Only users in UA are allowed to
successfully search and write to the database.
UM is an oﬄine user manager of the data owner orga-
nization and is responsible for user enrollment and revoca-
tion; therefore we assume that UM is trusted and all in-
teractions with UM are secure (Please do not confuse UM
with the system administrator of the database server). We
consider a semi-trusted Serv as in Goldreich (2004), in the
sense that it does not deviate from the prescribed protocol
execution while it may try to derive as much information
as possible from user queries and database access patterns.
In particular, we assume that it will not launch active at-
tacks such as collusion with users. Our trust model for
Serv is based on the following observation. In practice,
most database hosting services are run by large and rep-
utable IT service providers which clearly understand the
paramount importance of corporate reputation for busi-
ness success. Therefore, it is logical to assume that the
database hosting server follows trusted-but-curious (semi-
trusted) behavior. Active attacks are easy to detect/notice
and therefore risk the server from being caught. Even a
rumor of violation of rules will result in very bad publicity
and damage a company’s reputation.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we use the following
notations. For a set S, we write x ∈R S to denote that x
is selected uniformly at random from S, and write |S| to
denote the size of S. For an algorithm A, x ← A denotes
that A outputs x. A function ν : N→ [0, 1] is negligible if
for any polynomial p, there exists kp ∈ N such that for all
k ≥ kp, ν(k) ≤ 1/p(k). For convenience of reference, other
notations used in the sequel are listed in Table 1.
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Table 1: Notations
Notation Semantic
kUM the secret key of UM
e the encryption key for record encryption
qku, ComKu user u’s query key and her complementary
key, respectively
U-ComK a list of 2-tuples (u,ComKu) maintained
by Serv
3.2 Definitions
We now define the multi-user encrypted database system
and its security notions. A multi-user encrypted database
system, denoted by Γ, consists of the following algorithms:
• Setup(1κ). A probabilistic algorithm executed by UM
to set up the system and to initialize system-wide pa-
rameters, where κ is the security parameter. The al-
gorithm outputs a secret key kUM for UM and the
record encryption key e for a semantically secure sym-
metric key encryption scheme.
• Enroll(kUM , u). Executed by UM to enroll user u to
the system. Taking as input kUM and user identity
u, it outputs a pair of query key and complementary
key (qku, ComKu) for u. qku and e are then securely
transported to user u, and ComKu is securely passed
to Serv who then updates the U-ComK list by insert-
ing a new entry (u,ComKu).
• GenIndex(qku, w;ComKu). An interactive algorithm
run between user u and Serv to generate an index for
keyword w. User u sends an index request on w to
Serv, who then computes a response using the corre-
sponding ComKu. Finally, u outputs I(w) based on
Serv’s response.
• Write(qku, e, di;ComKu). Run between user u and
Serv to write an encrypted record d′i to D
′. The user
u first invokes GenIndex(qku, di.w;ComKu) to gener-
ate I(di.w), then computes E(di) using e, and finally
passes d′i = 〈E(di), I(di.w)〉 to Serv which appends it
to D′.
• ConstructQ(qku, w). Run by a user u to construct a
query. It takes as input the secret query key qku and
a chosen keyword w, and outputs a query qu(w).
• Search(qu(w), ComKu, D′). Run by Serv to search D′
for records containing w. Namely, on a query qu(w),
it outputs aq = {E(di) | di ∈ D, di.w = w}.
• Revoke(u). Run by UM to evict a user from the sys-
tem. On an input user identity u, it revokes u’s search
capability. As a result, UA = UA\{u}, UR = UR∪{u},
and u is no longer able to search the database.
A multi-user encrypted database system Γ is cor-
rect if an authorized user can always get the cor-
rect query reply. More formally, ∀u ∈ UA,∀w ∈
W,Search(ConstructQ(qku, w), ComKu, D′) = {E(di) |
di ∈ D, di.w = w}.
We also formalize several security requirements of the
multi-user encrypted database system, including query pri-
vacy, query unforgeability and revocability.
Query Privacy A common security requirement for all
searchable encryption schemes is query privacy, which is
a security notion on the amount of information leakage to
the server regarding user queries. As discussed in Curt-
mola et al. (2006), any searchable encryption scheme in-
evitably reveals certain query traces (defined shortly) to
the server, unless using the private information retrieval
techniques, or PIR for short (Chor et al., 1995). We re-
fer interested readers to Beimel et al. (2002); Chor et al.
(1995); Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky (1997); Lipmaa (2005)
for various discussions on PIR. For searchable encryption,
the server always observes the database access patterns
(e.g. two queries have the same reply), albeit the server
is unable to determine the keyword in a query. However,
apart from the information that can be acquired via ob-
servation and the information derived from it, no other
information should be exposed to the server.
For a record di, we use id(di) to denote the identify-
ing information that is uniquely associated with di, such
as its database position or its memory location. For a
query q and its reply (i.e., the outputs of Search) aq, we
define Ω(q) = {uq, id(aq)}, where uq is the issuer of q and
id(aq) represents the identifying information of each record
in aq. Let Qt = (q1, · · · , qt) be a sequence of t queries
from the user group, and let Wt = (w1, w2..., wt) be the
corresponding queried keywords, and At = (a1, a2, ..., at)
be the corresponding t replies, where t ∈ N and is polyno-
mially bounded. We define Vt as the view of an adversary
(i.e., Serv) over the t queries as the transcript of the in-
teractions between Serv and the involved query issuers,
together with some common knowledge. Specifically, Vt =
(D′ = (ED, ID), id(d′1), ..., id(d
′
|D′|),U-ComK list, Qt, At).
Following the notation from Curtmola et al. (2006),
the trace of the t queries is defined to be: Tt =
(|D′|, id(d′1), ..., id(d′|D′|),Ω(q1), ...,Ω(qt), |UA|), which con-
tains all the information that we allow the adversary to
obtain. Note that |UA| equals the number of entries in
the U-ComK list. A simulation-based definition of query
privacy is formally presented as follows.
Definition 1 (Query Privacy). A multi-user encrypted
database system Γ achieves query privacy if for all
database D, for all t ∈ N, for all PPT algorithm A, there
exists a PPT algorithm (the simulator) A∗, such that for
all Vt, Tt, for any function f :
|Pr[A(Vt) = f(D,Wt)]− Pr[A∗(Tt) = f(D,Wt)]| < ν(κ)
where the probability is taken over the internal coins of A
and A∗.
Intuitively, the notion of query privacy requires that all
information on the original database and the queried key-
words that can be computed by Serv from the transcript
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of interactions she obtains (i.e., Vt) can also be computed
from what it is allowed to know (i.e. Tt). In other words,
a system satisfying query privacy does not leak any in-
formation beyond the information we allow the adversary
to have. Note that query privacy implies record secrecy,
i.e. the encrypted database D′ = (ED, ID) does not reveal
information on the original database.
Remark 1. We stress that in the definition of query
privacy, user-server collusion is not included in our adver-
sarial model. As we argued earlier, this is a practically
rational assumption. On the other hand, from a technical
perspective, user-server collusion is able to comprise any
searchable encryption scheme, since the sever can always
compare the access patterns between a target user and the
colluding user.
Query Unforgeability In our system, queries issued by
user u is generated by her individual secret query key,
which is distinct to any other user’s query key. It is thus a
basic requirement that neither another user nor the server
can generate a legitimate query on behalf of u. We refer
to this property, which is only applicable to the multiple-
user setting, as query unforgeability. Query unforgeability
allows a query to be uniquely bound to its issuer in a prov-
able way. Therefore, it is the security basis of other system
features, e.g. accountability and non-repudiation.
To define query unforgeability, we first define the le-
gitimacy of user queries. For a user u ∈ U , we de-
fine u’s legitimate query set as Qu = {qu(w)|qu(w) ←
ConstructQ(qku, w), w ∈ W}. Namely, a query is user u’s
legitimate query if it is indeed constructed by running Con-
structQ with qku. Therefore, an informal meaning of query
unforgeability is that for any user u, no adversary is able
to compute q satisfying q ∈ Qu without compromising qku.
Query unforgeability is defined based on a game between
an adversary and a challenger. We consider two types of
adversaries: malicious users (possibly in a collusion) and
Serv. They have different knowledge and attack capa-
bilities. Let AU be the adversary representing malicious
users and AS representing Serv. Let uˆ be the target user.
In AU ’s game, the challenger simulates the execution of
Γ and offers an oracle Ø which answers AU ’s queries on
the executions of Enroll, GenIndex, Write, Search, and Con-
structQ(qkuˆ, ·) which allows AU to obtain queries on key-
words of her choices with respect to user uˆ1. In AS ’s game,
she has the knowledge of all users’ complementary keys and
a collection of uˆ’s queries (gathered when uˆ searches the
database). Thus the challenger gives AS the oracle access
to ConstructQ(qkuˆ, ·).
The game is the following: the adversary (either AU
or AS) first picks her target user uˆ. Then for AU , she
is given the query keys of the remaining users, and she
queries Ø at her will with the restriction that the number
of queries is polynomial-bounded. For AS , she is given
the complementary keys of all users including the target
1An malicious user may observe uˆ’s queries by attacking her sys-
tem or the communication channel.
user, and the oracle access to ConstructQ(qkuˆ, ·). In the
end, the adversary halts and returns a query q. Let Q′uˆ
denote the set of uˆ’s queries obtained by the adversary
from querying ConstructQ(qkuˆ, ·). The adversary wins the
game if and only if q ∈ Quˆ \ Q′uˆ. The advantage of the
adversary against query unforgeability is defined as the
probability of she winning the game. We summarize the
notion of query unforgeability as follows.
Definition 2 (Query Unforgeability). A multi-user
encrypted database system Γ achieves query unforgeabil-
ity if for any uˆ ∈ U , for all PPT algorithms AU and AS:
Pr[q ∈ Quˆ \Q′uˆ :(kUM , e)← Setup(1κ);
∀u ∈ U (qku, ComKu)← Enroll(kUM , u);
q ← AØU ({qku|u ∈ U \ {uˆ}})
or q ← AConstructQ(qkuˆ,·)S ({ComKu|u ∈ U})
] < ν(κ)
where the probability is taken over the internal coins of AU ,
AS,Setup, and Enroll.
Remark 2. Since each user possesses a distinct query
key, it would be a natural requirement to maintain secrecy
of query keys, i.e., a query key is only known to its owner.
It is straightforward to observe that if a system is query
unforgeable, it also preserves secrecy of query keys. Other-
wise, the knowledge of the target’s query key easily leads
to generating a legitimate query.
Revocability User eviction is an indispensable part of
a multi-user application. It is desirable to allow UM to
revoke the search capabilities of users who are deemed no
longer appropriate to search the database. Since the inca-
pability of searching the database indexes is implied by the
incapability of distinguishing them, we define revocability
based on index indistinguishability.
An adversary’s advantage in attacking revocability is de-
fined as her winning probability in the following game. The
adversary A runs in two stages, A1 and A2: In the first
stage, A1 acts as an authorized user and is allowed to ac-
cess the oracle Ø as in Definition 2. At the end of the first
stage, A1 chooses two new keywords w1 and w2, which
have not been queried thus far. Let state represent the
knowledge A1 gains during the first stage. In the second
stage, A2 is revoked, and is given the index of one of the
two keywords. A2 finally outputs a bit b′. A wins the
game if and only if b′ = b. We summarize the notion of
revocability as follows.
Definition 3 (Revocability). A multi-user encrypted
database query system Γ achieves revocability if for all PPT
algorithms A = (A1,A2):
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Pr[b′ = b : (kUM , e)← Setup(1κ);
∀u ∈ UA (qku, ComKu)← Enroll(kUM , u);
(qkA, ComKA)← Enroll(kUM ,A);
(state, w0, w1)← AØ1 (qkA);
Revoke(A);
b ∈R {0, 1}, I(wb)← GenIndex(qku, wb;ComKu)u∈RUA ;
b′ ← A2(state, I(wb), w0, w1),
] < 1/2 + ν(κ)
where the probability is taken over the internal coins of A,
Setup, Enroll, and the instance of u.
Intuitively, the definition demands that all successful
searches rely on the assistance from Serv using the cor-
responding complementary keys. With this feature, UM
is able to efficiently revoke a user by instructing Serv to
delete the relevant key.
Remark 3. The definition of revocability based on
the index indistinguishability addresses the cryptographic
strength of the searching protocol. A revoked user might
mount attacks on the system or the communication chan-
nel in order to perform a search. For instance a replayed
query may help a revoked user to search the database. We
argue that this type of attacks can be neutralized by de-
ploying secure communication channels or a user authenti-
cation mechanism, which are out of the scope of this paper.
4 OUR CONSTRUCTION
We begin with a brief review of the technical preliminaries
used in our protocol and proofs.
4.1 Technical Preliminaries
Random Oracle Model The Random Oracle Model
(Bellare and Rogaway, 1993; Fiat and Shamir, 1986) is
a paradigm to simplify cryptographic protocol design by
modelling cryptographic hash functions as random func-
tions (random oracles) publicly accessible by all parties.
In particular, the simulation for a random oracle is by
a Query-Response list {〈q1, r1〉, ...}: given a query q, the
Query-Response list is scanned to see whether this query
has been previously issued. If a matched entry 〈qi, ri〉 is
found (i.e., qi = q), the corresponding ri is returned as
response; otherwise, a random element r is selected from
the range of the hash function and returned as response.
In the latter case, a new entry 〈q, r〉 is inserted into the
Query-Response list. While it has been shown in Canetti
et al. (1998) that security under the random oracle model
does not imply security in the real world since no existing
hash function behaves the same as a random oracle, this
concept remains a useful tool to analyze the security of
cryptographic constructions.
Pseudorandom Function and Pseudorandom Per-
mutation Loosely speaking, a pseudorandom function
is a function whose outputs cannot be efficiently distin-
guished from the outputs of truly random functions. A
keyed cryptographic hash function is often modeled as a
pseudorandom function. The main difference between a
pseudorandom function and the above random oracle is
that the former can be accessed only by the key holder,
while the latter is publicly accessible. If a pseudorandom
function is a permutation, then it is pseudorandom per-
mutation. Symmetric key encryption schemes are often
modeled as pseudorandom permutations.
Bilinear Map Let G1 and G2 be two groups of prime
order p. A bilinear map is a function eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2,
satisfying the following properties:
1. Bilinear: For all g1, g2 ∈ G1 and all x1, x2 ∈ Z∗p ,
eˆ(gx11 , g
x2
2 ) = eˆ(g1, g2)
x1x2 .
2. Non-degenerate: If g is a generator of G1, then eˆ(g, g)
is a generator of G2.
3. Computable: eˆ(g1, g2) can be efficiently computed for
any g1, g2 ∈ G1.
Note that the G1 is a Gap-Diffie-Hellman group (GDH
group), where the Decisional DH problem (DDH) is easy
while the Computational DH problem (CDH) is still hard.
The CDH problem is to compute gab, given g, ga, gb; and
the DDH problem is to determine c ?= gab, given g, ga, gb, c,
where G is a cyclic group generated by g of prime order p,
c ∈R G, and a, b ∈R Z∗p .
BLS Short Signature Boneh et al. (2001) proposed a
short signature scheme based on bilinear maps. A brief
recall of the scheme is as follows: Let G1, G2, eˆ be defined
as the above, and g be a generator of G1; h : {0, 1}∗ → G1
be a collision resistant hash function. A user’s key pair
is (x ∈ Z∗p , y = gx ∈ G1), where x is the private signing
key. Then, the signature on a message m is defined to be
σ = h(m)x. Signature verification is to check eˆ(g, σ) ?=
eˆ(y, h(m)). The BLS short signature achieves existential
un-forgeability if h is modeled as a random oracle.
4.2 Protocol
We now present our construction. Let G1, G2 be two cyclic
groups of a prime order p, and a bilinear map eˆ : G1×G1 →
G2 between them as defined above. Let g be the generator
of G1. Let [m]k denote an encryption of a message m ∈
M under a secure symmetric encryption scheme with the
secret key k ∈ K, where M is the message domain and K
is the domain of the secret key. We use 〈c〉k to denote its
decryption. Let h : G2 → K be a collision-resistant hash
function mapping an element in G2 to an element in K, and
hs : S ×W → G1 be a keyed hash function under a seed
s ∈ S that maps a keyword to an element in G1, where S is
the domain of the secret seeds. The details of our protocol
for the multi-user encrypted database system (MuPQ) are
shown in Figure 1. In this construction, the encryption of
records is performed using a semantically secure symmetric
key encryption E() with the key e. Note that [.]k and E()
6
can be different symmetric encryption schemes (in fact, [.]k
is not necessarily semantically secure), so we distinguish
them for clarity reason.
Note also that while the database server Serv maintains
a Com K list, the list is not intended to enforce access con-
trol, or to make any verification on the legitimacy of the
user or the relationship between the user and the comple-
mentary key ComKu. Serv simply uses the complemen-
tary key indicated by the querying user in the algorithm
of Search.
4.3 Correctness
The correctness of the protocol is straightforward.
Suppose that a record 〈E(di), I(w)〉 is generated
by user u, where di.w = w and I(w) = 〈r, [r]k〉.
Note that k = h(eˆ(hs(w)rw , ComKu)xu/rw) =
h(eˆ(hs(w)rw , gx/xu)xu/rw) = h(eˆ(hs(w), g)x). Con-
sider a user u¯ with a secret key xu¯ and a complementary
key at Serv being ComKu¯. Her query on the keyword
w is qu¯(w) = hs(w)xu¯ ; and the key used in Search is
thus k′ = h(eˆ(qu¯(w), ComKu¯)) = h(eˆ(hs(w)xu¯ , g
x
xu¯ )) =
h(eˆ(hs(w), g)x). Since k = k′, E(di) is inserted into the
reply set and returned to u¯ according to the protocol. We
remark that since h(·) and hs(·) are collision resistant
hash functions, the probability of computing the same key
from two different keywords are negligible.
4.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of our protocol,
and in particular show that the construction of MuPQ in
Figure 1 satisfies the security requirements in Section 3.
Query Privacy. We first prove that our protocol
achieves query privacy in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. MuPQ achieves query privacy in Defini-
tion 1 if E(·) and [·]k are pseudorandom permutations and
hs(·) is a pseudorandom function.
Proof. It suffices for us to construct a PPT simulator
A∗ such that for all t ∈ N, for all PPT adversaries
A, all functions f , given the trace of t queries Tt,
A∗ can simulate A(Vt) with non-negligible proba-
bility. More specifically, we show that A∗(Tt) can
generate a view V ∗t which is computationally indis-
tinguishable from Vt, the actual view of A. Recall
that Tt = (|D′| = m, 1, ...,m,Ω(q1), ...,Ω(qt), |UA|)
and Vt = (ED = {E(d1), ..., E(dm)}, ID =
{I1, ..., Im}, 1, ...,m,U-ComK, Qt, At).
For t = 0 (Qt = ∅, At = ∅), A∗ builds
V ∗t = (E
∗
D = {E(d1)∗, ..., E(dm)∗}, I∗D =
{I∗1 , ..., I∗m}, 1, ...,m,U-ComK∗) as follows. For
1 ≤ i ≤ m, it selects E(di)∗ ∈R {0, 1}|E(di)|, and sets
I∗i = 〈I∗i [1], I∗i [2]〉, where I∗i [1] ∈R M and I∗i [2] ∈R M. To
construct U-ComK∗, for each entry A∗ selects a random
user identity and sets the corresponding complementary
key as a random element from G1 (the total number of
entries is |UA|, which is contained in Tt). It is easy to check
that V ∗t and Vt are computationally indistinguishable
if the symmetric encryption (i.e., used to instantiate E
and [·]k) is pseudorandom permutation. Note that in
this proof, we did not consider the process of generating
D′, and assume that D′ is already in place. In fact,
the generation of D′ in MuPQ does not provide A any
additional knowledge on the keywords, since the only
extra information A obtains by observing the generation
of D′ is hs(w)rw for each w (rw ∈R Z∗p ), which clearly is
computationally indistinguishable from a random element
from G1.
For t > 0, A∗ builds V ∗t =
(E∗D, I
∗
D, 1, ...,m,U-ComK
∗, Q∗t , A
∗
t ) as follows. To
be general, we suppose that all queries in Qt are from
distinct users (recall that the querier of a query can be
seen from Ω(qi)), but some of them may query the same
keywords. For 1 ≤ j ≤ |UA|, it selects x∗j ∈R Z∗p and sets
x∗ = x∗1 × ...× x∗|UA|.
• Generating E∗D: Generation of E∗D is the same as in
the case of t = 0, where each E(di)∗ is a random value.
• Generating Q∗t : Recall that from Ω(q1), ...,Ω(qt) con-
tained in Vt, A∗ can determine which queries ask the
same keyword. For each Ω(qi), it selects a random
user identity u∗i as the querier, and picks up an el-
ement from {x∗1, ..., x∗|UA|}, say x∗i , for u∗i . If there
does not exist j < i such that Ω(qj) = Ω(qi) (note
that Ω(qj) = Ω(qi) means that qi and qj ask the same
keyword), selects a random element rg ∈R G1 and
computes q∗i = r
x∗i
g . Otherwise, re-uses the same rg
for q∗j to compute q
∗
i .
• Generating U-ComK∗: We actually associate each x∗i
with a user in UA. Accordingly, the complementary
key corresponding to x∗i is computed as g
x∗/x∗i . To
organize the U-ComK∗, the users together with the
corresponding complementary keys involved in gener-
ating Q∗t should be placed to the appropriate positions
according to Ω(q1), ...,Ω(qt), while the remaining users
and complementary keys can be placed randomly to
fill the remaining entries of the list.
• Generating I∗D: From Ω(qi), 1 ≤ i ≤ t, A∗ knows
which records are retrieved by query qi. Recall that
for Ω(qi), q∗i is computed as r
x∗i
g . Computes k∗ =
h(eˆ(rg, g)x
∗
), and for each of the records retrieved by
qi, the index is set as 〈r ∈R M, [r]k∗〉. At last, the
index of each of the remaining records (i.e., those are
not retrieved by Qt) is set as 〈r1 ∈R M, r2 ∈R M〉.
• Generating A∗t : Generation of A∗t is straightforward.
A∗t is simply the set of records from E
∗
D whose id’s are
contained in Ω(q1), ...,Ω(qt).
We show that V ∗t is computationally indistinguishable
from Vt by comparing them component by component. It
is easy to see that if E is a pseudorandom permutation, E∗D
and ED are computationally indistinguishable. ForQ∗t and
Qt, let us consider an actual query qu(w) = hs(w)xu and
7
Setup(1κ) :UM sets up public system parameters G1, G2, and eˆ; selects x ∈R Z∗p and assigns
kUM = x; selects the random data encryption key e for E() and a random seed
s ∈ S for the keyed hash function hs.
Enroll(kUM , u):UM sets UA = UA ∪ {u}; selects xu ∈R Z∗p and computes ComKu = g
x
xu ∈ G1;
securely sends qku = (xu, s) and e to user u, and sends ComKu to Serv, who then
inserts a new entry (u,ComKu) to U-ComK.
GenIndex(qku, w;ComKu): To generate an index for keyword w, user u first selects a random blinding element
rw ∈R Z∗p , and computes and sends (u, hs(w)rw) to Serv. Upon receiving the gener-
ate index request, Serv returns ew = eˆ(hs(w)rw , ComKu) to u who then computes
k = h(exu/rww ) ∈ K, and sets the index for w as I(w) = 〈r, [r]k〉, where r ∈R M.
Outputs I(w).
Write(qku, e, di;ComKu): To write a record di to Serv, user u first generating the index of di.w (i.e., I(di.w))
by invoking GenIndex(qku, di.w;ComKu). Then u computes E(di) using e, and
passes d′i = 〈E(di), I(di.w)〉 to Serv.
ConstructQ(qku, w): User u computes qu(w) = hs(w)xu and outputs (u, qu(w)) as her query on the
keyword w.
Search(qu(w), ComKu, D′): Serv scans U-ComK to find ComKu. If no result, she outputs ⊥. Otherwise, using
ComKu, she computes k′ = h(eˆ(qu(w), ComKu)) and sets aqu(w) = ∅. For each
Ii ∈ ID in the form (A,B), she sets aqu(w) = aqu(w)∪{E(di)} if A = 〈B〉k′ . Finally,
she returns aqu(w) to user u.
Revoke(u):UM sets UA = UA \ {u} and UR = UR ∪{u}. Then she instructs Serv to delete the
entry of (u,ComKu) from the U-ComK list.
Figure 1: Construction of MuPQ.
a simulated query q∗u = r
x∗u
g , where rg ∈R G1: qu(w) and
q∗u are computationally indistinguishable if hs is a pseudo-
random function. For U-ComK∗ and U-ComK, an actual
complementary key gx/xu and a simulated complementary
key gx
∗/x∗u is indistinguishable, since xu and x∗u are ran-
dom values. It is also not hard to see that I∗D and ID are
computationally indistinguishable if [·]k is pseudorandom
permutation. Finally, given the above indistinguishabil-
ity results, the indistinguishability between A∗t and At is
straightforward. ¤
Remark 4. As a cautious note, the model and the above
proof for query privacy do not capture possible informa-
tion leakage to newly inserted records, especially after user
queries have been issued. As a matter of fact, some infor-
mation is indeed disclosed as long as a new record has a
keyword value, which has been queried by some user. To
see this, suppose the newly inserted record has a keyword
w. If a user has ever issued a query on w, the server gets
k′ = h(eˆ(hs(w), g)x) as per our scheme. With k′ at her dis-
posal, the server clearly can test whether the new record’s
keyword is w or not just as in the usual search algorithm.
We believe information leakage of this kind is tolerable, be-
cause by definition of searchable encryption, the server def-
initely learns which of the existing records have the same
keyword value after processing a user query.
Query unforgeability. In the following, we prove that
our protocol satisfies query unforgeability.
Theorem 2. If there exists a PPT adversary (either
AU or AS) that breaks the query unforgeability of MuPQ
in Definition 2 with an advantage ², then there exists a
PPT adversary B who can succeed in forging BLS short
signatures with the same amount of advantage.
Proof. We prove the theorem relative to AU and AS ,
respectively. Given a BLS short signature scheme as spec-
ified in Section 4.1, where x is the secret signing key and
y is the public key. Let B be a PPT adversary attempting
to forge a short signature with respect to y.
Case 1 (For AU ): Intuitively, AU obtains a set of
queries Q = {hs(w1)xuˆ , hs(w2)xuˆ , ...} of the target user
uˆ through the ConstructQ(qkuˆ, ·) oracle. Note that since
AU knows s, hs cannot be modeled as a pseudorandom
function; rather, it is modeled as a random oracle. As a
result, these queries are essentially the BLS short signa-
tures under the signing key xuˆ. If A computes hs(w)xuˆ
from Q, it clearly forges a signature on w. The detail of
the proof follows.
The proof involves constructing BO(x)(Desc(O(x))), on
input of Desc(O(x)) which is a description of an instance of
the BLS short signature scheme, and is provided the sign-
ing oracle O(x). Note that Desc(O(x)) includes g ∈ G1,
the public key y = gx, hash function h used in the signature
scheme, eˆ : G1 ×G1 → G2, and possibly other parameters
describing the scheme. The main idea is to set the signing
key x to be the secret query key of the target user. As such,
the most challenging part of the simulation is that if kUM
is selected randomly as in the original protocol construc-
tion, we have difficulty in computing the complementary
key of the target user, which should be gkUM/x, since we
only know gx. The trick we have is to let B choose kUM in
a “controlled” way, but AU does not detect the difference.
Specifically, the details of the simulation are as follows.
1. Setup: In setting up the system, B uses G1, G2, eˆ of
the BLS short signature scheme as system parameters.
B then selects a random seed s and a random data
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encryption key e. To generate kUM , B chooses a set
X = {x1, ..., xj , ...xmax}, where xj ∈R Z∗p and max
is the maximum number of user in the system which
is polynomially bounded by the security parameter κ.
Then B sets k˜UM = y
|X|∏
j=1
xj
= g
x.
|X|∏
j=1
xj ∈ G1. Note
that B actually does not need to know the discrete
logarithm of kUM .
2. Enroll: To enroll users in U to the system, B as-
signs a random element from X to a user as the
query key. In particular, for each ui ∈ U \ {uˆ},
chooses a distinct xi ∈ X, and sets (qkui , ComKui) =
((xi, s), yx1...xi−1xi+1...x|X|). for the target user uˆ, it
sets ComKuˆ = g
|X|∏
i=1
xi
(as a result, x = xuˆ is a compo-
nent of qkuˆ, which B tries to compute); B then gives
qkui , ui ∈ U \ {uˆ}, together with e to AU .
3. Answer O queries: B needs to answer the following
types of queries from AU : Enroll, GenIndex, Write,
Search, and ConstructQ(qkuˆ, ·). It should be clear that
B can trivially answer the queries of Enroll, GenIndex,
Write Search, because she has the correct complemen-
tary keys of all users. We thus focus on how B answers
ConstructQ(qkuˆ, ·) queries. AU can ask for queries
on keywords of her choice constructed using the tar-
get user’s query key. To answer a ConstructQ(qkuˆ, ·)
query, B resorts to its oracle O(x): on receiving a key-
word w, B submits the word to O(x); on getting the
reply from O(x), B tests the validity of the reply using
the verification algorithm of the signature scheme. If
it is not valid, B continues to query O(x) until gets
a valid reply. B then returns to AU the reply it gets
from O(x). Note that implicitly, O(x) simulates the
random oracle h(·), and provides the oracle access to
B. Moreover, since AU knows s, B needs to simulates
hs(·) to AU . To simulate hs(·), B uses the oracle h(·)
from Ø(x): in particular, whenever getting a message
from AU querying hs(·), B asks the same message to
h(·), and returns to AU what is returned from O(x).
As a result, the set of {hs(w1)xuˆ , hs(w2)xuˆ , ...} ob-
tained byAU is actually {h(w1)xuˆ , h(w2)xuˆ , ...}, which
is a set of the BLS signatures.
4. B finally outputs what AU outputs.
Case 2 (For AS): The proof is similar to Case 1.
To avoid redundancy, we only highlight the differences
between two proofs. AS also obtains a set of queries
Q = {hs(w1)xuˆ , hs(w2)xuˆ , ...} of the target user uˆ through
the ConstructQ(qkuˆ, ·) oracle, but AS does not know the
seed s. This intuitively suggests that forging a query is
much harder for AS than for AU . In the actual proof, B
does not choose s at all in Setup (the trick is actually that
B does not use any key for the hash function). Moreover,
B does not provides AS the oracle access to hs(·), since AS
does not know s and thus does not have access to hs(·).
The simulation by B is perfect in both cases. It is ob-
vious that if q on w output by AU or AS is a legitimate
query of the target user uˆ, then q must be equal to h(w)xuˆ ,
which is a valid BLS short signature on w. This completes
the proof. ¤
Revocability. The following theorem establishes that
the construction of MuPQ satisfies revocability.
Theorem 3. MuPQ achieves revocability in Defini-
tion 3 if [·]k is a secure encryption scheme.
Proof. The proof is pretty straightforward, and we only
state the intuition behind the proof. The indexes of the
two keywords w1 and w2 are I(w1) = 〈r1, [r1]k(w1)〉 and
I(w2) = 〈r2, [r2]k(w2)〉, where r1, r2 ∈R M, and k(w1) and
k(w2) denote the secret keys generated from w1 and w2,
respectively. Since the complementary key of a revoked
user is deleted from the U-ComK list, the revoked user
can never get k(w1) and k(w2) from the keywords and the
query key it has; moreover, it cannot get the keys either if
[·]k is a secure encryption scheme that does not expose the
encryption key. As a result, I(w1) and I(w2) are indepen-
dent of w1 and w2, respectively, from the perspective of the
revoked user. So the advantage of the adversary guessing
the correct bit cannot be significantly more than 1/2. ¤
4.5 Performance and Improvement
We focus on the online query process, as other procedures
(algorithms) have constant computational overhead. For
query issuance, the main computation at the user side is
simply an exponentiation operation. Thus its computa-
tional complexity is O(1). For a query process, the main
computation at the server side includes a pairing operation,
and m symmetric key decryption (i.e., sequential search),
wherem is the number of records. Thus the computational
complexity is asymptotically O(m). Note that all existing
single-user searchable encryption schemes except those in
Curtmola et al. (2006) require O(m) server computation.
This suggests that the searching efficiency of our protocol
does not downgrade due to supporting multiple users.
The computation cost of Curtmola et al. (2006) is linear
to the size of the keyword set, instead of the document
set. This performance gain is due to a preprocessing of all
documents so that the index of a keyword links together
all relevant documents. However, it introduces more cost
in document deletion or insertion. A possible optimization
approach for our scheme is for the server to group the
records retrieved by a reply together by sharing a common
index (since they contain the same keyword). It saves the
server from repetitively searching the same keyword. As
the system proceeds, this can greatly reduce the server
computation overhead.
More performance gain is possible as long as binary
search rather than sequential search could be performed
in query processing. In the above scheme, since sequential
testing is required, binary search clearly is not feasible.
Inspired by Yang et al. (2006), we next give a technique
for query speedup, allowing for binary search. We how-
ever note that this technique is more suitable for static
databases where record insertion by individual users sel-
dom occurs. As an example, an application scenario for
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multi-user static databases is that a company outsources
a database to a database server, and allows its employees
or cooperators to access the database from the server, but
does not wish them to update the database. Of course,
there is no hurdle for the data owner organization to up-
date the database.
Query Speedup This approach needs extra data struc-
tures. In particular, we add some metadata to the en-
crypted database so as to facilitate query processing, avoid-
ing sequential testing: the metadata for a record is a tag
and a link that points to the corresponding record. The
tag is determined by the keyword of the record, and the
metadata is sorted according to the tags. At the time of
querying database, a user sends the corresponding tag to
the server, who then binary-searches the sorted metadata,
and follows the link to locate the queried record. We use
Figure 2 as a toy example to illustrate the concept of meta-
data. The database has 5 records, whose keywords are 128,
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Figure 2: Exposition of metadata
666, 372, 152, 490, respectively, and the corresponding tags
derived from these keywords are 35, 98, 21, 37, 54. As a
result, the metadata after sorting is of the form (21, link
to record “372”), (35, link to record “128”), (37,
link to record “152”), (54, link to record “490”),
and (98, link to record “666”).
In this method, we have to consider multiple occurrences
of the same keyword value in different records. The same
keyword value in different records should generate distinct
tags; otherwise, the adversary such as the database server
will know those records that have the same keyword by
simply inspecting the database. Our solution to this issue
is the following. Recall that in the above scheme kUM = x,
E() is the encryption for records, and hs is a keyed hash
function. Let h′(.) be another collision resistant crypto-
graphic hash function. For a record di, whose keyword is
di.w = w, suppose that this is the cth occurrence of w
in the database. Then the tag for di.w is computed as
tg = h′(eˆ(hs(w), gx), c), and the link associated with tg is
pointed to E(di), the encrypted record2. The metadata is
passed to the database server, together with the encrypted
database.
2We suppose that generation of the encrypted database is by the
user manager, who belongs to the data owner organization.
To query w, user u computes and sends qu(w) =
hs(w)xu to the database server, who then computes k′ =
eˆ(qu(w), ComKu). The database server continues to per-
forms the following steps: it repeatedly binary searches
the metadata in order to find out all tags derived from the
same keyword value. Note that the server stops once no
matching tag is found (i.e., lnk = NULL).
c = 0;
Repeat
c = c+1;
tg = h′(k′, c);
lnk = Binary-Search(tg, Metadata);
If lnk = NULL
Return;
Else
Collect the record pointed by lnk to user u.
End (of Repeat)
We next point out the reason why this method does not
apply to dynamic databases supporting record insertion
by individual users. When a user computes the tag for
a new record, she must know the number of occurrences
of the keyword value of that record; but this information
is not easy to get in our setting. Adding another data
structure containing keywords together with their number
of occurrences as in Yang et al. (2006) does not totally
solve the problem. Of course, updates by the data owner
organization who outsources the database are still easy,
since it knows this information. However, it should be
clear that if we are willing to reveal the information on the
number of occurrences of a keyword, our technique readily
supports dynamic database update by individual users.
5 CONCLUSION
Existing efforts on searchable encryption have focused on
single-user settings. Directly extending a searchable en-
cryption scheme for the single-user setting to the multi-
user setting has several downsides, e.g., the consider-
able costs associated with re-distributing query keys and
re-generating the encrypted database. To solve theses
problems, in this paper we presented a systematic study
on searchable encryption under a practical multi-user
database setting. We first formulated a system model as
well as a set of security requirements, then presented a con-
crete construction which provably satisfies those require-
ments. In our construction, each user employs a distinct
key, and consequently, user revocation does not entail up-
dating of query keys and re-encryption of the database, and
is transparent to the non-revoked users. Moreover, each
authorized user can also insert and search the database,
an important feature to data sharing in the multi-user set-
ting. Our construction is efficient, achieving similar per-
formance as most of the existing single-user schemes. Bet-
ter yet, in case of static databases where record insertion
by individual users is not supported, we can further im-
prove performance to binary search rather than sequential
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search.
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